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PC Crane, LLC will be referred to as "PC Crane." Defendants David Belcher,
Vernon Belcher, and Paul Belcher (all owners of PC Crane) will collectively be referred
to as "Belchers." Defendants McQueen Masonry, Inc., Central Equipment, LC, McQueen
Crane Services, LC, and James McQueen will be collectively referred to as "McQueen."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' Brief advanced a Statement of Facts upon which McQueen also relies
for the cross-appeal. Cross-appellants' Statement of Facts is inaccurate in the following
respects:
PC Crane sued to avoid payment under the Goodwill Notes, which allow
attorney's fees. PC Crane states in Paragraphs A.l and 3 that the parties' "agreements"
do not provide for attorney's fees. The purchase Agreement(s) prescribed that goodwill/
consulting services were to be paid for by attached Promissory Notes, which included
attorney's fees provisions. [Ex. 2 (see p. 1, fifth "Whereas," and Promissory Note
attached as Exhibit E); Ex. 7 (see paragraphs 2 and 3 and Promissory Note attached as
i

Exhibit A)]. Paragraph A.4 states that PC Crane sued "to recover as damages the
goodwill payments . . . under the Purchase Agreements." The goodwill "payments," by
PC Crane's own admission, are the payments required under the $228,800 Note and the
$177,600 Note (the "Goodwill Notes"). [R. 3,1f 25; R. 6,ffif33-34]. In suing to recover
their "damages" for a lack of goodwill, the only relief sought by PC Crane was the

i

recovery of all payments made under the Goodwill Notes. PC Crane at trial offered Ex,
13 to prove the amount of its total "damages" — it sets forth only the amounts paid under
.

-

•

'

•

•

<

the Goodwill Notes.
•1
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i

The Stipulation deferring default remedies has no application as concerns
entitlement to attorney's fees for default. At Paragraphs C. 18-25, PC Crane states that
the parties entered into a Stipulation that deferred the due dates of payments under the
Notes, which eliminated any default. The Stipulation, given as an accommodation to PC
Crane, relieved PC Crane of paying the balloon payments under the Notes until this case
was decided [R. 1514-15,ffif4, 8] and deferred the exercise of default remedies based
thereon [R. 1515, *j{ 11]. PC Crane, absent the Stipulation, did not pay either Note timely.1
PC Crane fails to note that the Stipulation provided that ''nothing contained herein shall
affect or impair any right that any party may have to recover costs, expenses, or attorney's
fees from any other party pursuant to the Trust Deed, the $228,800 Note, the $ 177,600
Note, or any other agreement." [R. 1515, ^f 11]. As concerns entitlement to attorney's
fees based on default, therefore, the Stipulation is by its own terms inapplicable.
McQueen did initiate action to recover their fees. In Section D, PC Crane
asserts that McQueen did not initiate any "legal action" to recover attorney's fees.
McQueen asserted the only "legal action" they could — in response to PC Crane's
Complaint seeking to avoid all liability under the Goodwill Notes, McQueen filed an
Answer asserting PC Crane's liability under those Notes and, in the prayer of that
Answer, requested that McQueen "be awarded their costs, expenses, and attorney's fees
. . . . " [R. 106].

^ h e balloon payment under the $177,600 Note was due April 1, 2008 (Ex. 8) and
was paid August 27, 2008 [R. 3570, «| 36]. The balloon payment under the $228,800
Note was due October 30, 2007 (Ex. 11) and was paid August 27, 2008 [R. 3569, % 35].
2
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McQueen did not object to being paid; they objected to being forced to release
their collateral. In Section E, PC Crane suggests that McQueen unreasonably contested
Judge Dever's Order forcing McQueen to accept payment under the Goodwill Notes.
Payment was not the problem. PC Crane wanted to free up the property covered by
McQueen's Trust Deed securing the Goodwill Notes and filed a Motion asking the Court
to force McQueen to accept payment under the Goodwill Notes and to reconvey its Trust
Deed. [R. 2165-97]. Judge Dever then entered an Order requiring McQueen to accept
payment under the Notes and reconvey the Trust Deed securing those Notes. [R. 2757].
McQueen objected on the ground that Judge Dever's Order forced McQueen to reconvey
their Trust Deed, which was also security for attorney's fees yet to be awarded. [R.
2198]. Judge Dever's Order left McQueen unsecured both with respect to the attorney's
fees that have already been granted as sanctions and those that this Court may award.
McQueen did not object to being paid; they objected to being forced to give up the Trust
Deed's security for attorney's fees, for which they bargained.
The Goodwill Notes were the subject of this action. PC Crane also asserts in
Section E that "the Promissory Notes were not the subject of this litigation." ffl E.35].
PC Crane sued McQueen to recover all payments made for goodwill (i.e., the payments
made under the Goodwill Notes).2 Because Judge Dever's Order required McQueen to
accept payment under the Goodwill Notes and to reconvey their Trust Deed before trial,

Paragraphs 25 and 34 of its Complaint allege that the Goodwill Notes were the
payment for goodwill. The Complaint prayed for judgment relieving PC Crane of its
obligation to pay for goodwill. PC Crane sought no damages other than the payments it
made under the Goodwill Notes.
3
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the issue of non-payment under the Notes was no longer an issue at trial. The Jury found
PC Crane had performed all of its obligations because Judge Dever had already forced
McQueen to accept payment under the Notes and to reconvey the security for those Notes.
What was an issue was whether PC Crane was entitled to recover as damages from
McQueen all payments made by PC Crane under the Goodwill Notes. On this issue, the
Jury found that McQueen had not breached their duty to supply goodwill and, as a
consequence, PC Crane was not entitled to recover all the payments that it made under the
Goodwill Notes.
The second purchase Agreement was signed in mid-April, 2005. In Section F,
Paragraph 41, PC Crane asserts that the second purchase Agreement was "signed" in
March, 2005 citing R. 2423, which contains no evidence to that effect. Although this
Agreement is dated in March, 2005, it was executed3 and the transaction closed between
April 14 and 15, 2005. [R. 1910 (Guaranty executed April 4, 2005); R. 1911-14 (Trust
Deed executed April 15, 2005); V. Belcher Depo., R. 1899, pp. 23-25; D. Belcher Depo.,
R. 1902-03, pp. 70-71 (all closing documents signed together)].
The trailer issue. In Sections G and H (Appellees' Brief, pp. 13-15), PC Crane
argues that the "Fontaine trailer," which was admittedly the only trailer PC Crane ever
modified, was not the trailer on which PC Crane and Stam collaborated. First, the facts

3

The date the parties executed the second purchase Agreement documents is
significant because Stam and Belchers had extensive communications prior to the signing
of these documents. PC Crane and Belchers claimed they executed the documents for the
second purchase transaction without knowing of Stam's involvement in McQueen's
business and without ever having had any substantive communication with Stam.
4
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establish that the Fontaine trailer was in fact4 the one to which reference was made in the
documents given to Bank of American Fork (this document is in McQueen's Addendum
at pp. 18-26 [the "Bank Disclosure"]). Second, and this is the important point, even if,
against all the evidence5, the Fontaine trailer was not the one referred to in the Bank
Disclosure, the problem is that PC Crane and its counsel over an eight-month period
falsely stated again and again that there were two modified trailers, and there was a
modified trailer on which Stam and Belchers collaborated, which was built in 2006. In
Section I, Paragraphs 59-62, PC Crane advances an extraordinarily incomplete
description of its responses and communications concerning the trailer, and then
concludes in Paragraph 1.62 that these facts "support the statements of Mr. Burghardt at
the September 5, 2007 hearing that the 'collaboration' was in 2006 . . . ." — the
implication being that Burghardt told the Court that there was only "collaboration," not
construction of a trailer.6 This Burghardt quotation is incomplete. He represented to the
Court that the subject trailer and collaboration occurred after the end of 2005.7 PC

4

Appellants' Brief at pp. 21-22 explains why this is so.

5

To assume that the Fontaine trailer was not the trailer on which collaboration
occurred, one must (i) conclude that PC Crane in the Bank Disclosure falsely stated that
such a trailer was created and in fact increased PC Crane's revenues, and (ii) conclude
that all of the statements of PC Crane and its counsel over an eight-month period to the
effect that there was a trailer on which Stam and PC Crane collaborated were also false.
See also id.
6

PC Crane's counsel indicated on multiple occasions to the Court and McQueen's
counsel that there was collaboration on a trailer that was modified and existed.
[Appellants' Brief, pp. 13-21; 35-38].
7

The full quote appears in Appellants'Brief at p. 15. [R. 4001; T. 50-52].
5
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Crane's Brief makes no effort to justify or explain the litany of other false statements by
PC Crane's counsel to the Court and McQueen's counsel over an eight-month period —
all to the effect that there were two modified trailers and that there was a trailer on which
Stam and Belchers collaborated which was created in 2006 - at an irrelevant time.
The trailer was important at trial. Section J, Paragraphs 63-65, suggest that the
trailer issue was unimportant at trial, an issue seemingly irrelevant to whether PC Crane
should be sanctioned for misrepresenting facts and hiding evidence. In fact, the trailer
issue was absolutely critical at trial.8
Findings regarding sanctions. In Section K, PC Crane suggests that the District
Court made essentially no findings to support the award of sanctions. The District
Court's Memorandum Decision [R. 3913-14] found that PC Crane's counsel represented
both to the Court and to McQueen's counsel that Stam and PC Crane "had collaborated
on a custom-designed trailer" and that PC Crane "had built a different trailer for a
different crane that was not the subject of [McQueen's] discovery requests." The District
Court found that at a later date, "Plaintiffs' counsel represented to Defense Counsel that
the trailer at issue was never built and that no documents existed." The District Court
then stated, "The Court finds that Plaintiffs' [PC Crane's] position on March 26, 2008,

8

McQueen introduced the Bank Disclosure [Ex. 61], documents establishing that
the trailer was acquired and modified in the period between March 9, 2005 and April 8,
2005 [Exs. 85, 86], and Belchers' testimony that the only trailer modified was the
Fontaine, which was modified before the second Agreement with McQueen. This
evidence established that Stam and Belchers were communicating and collaborating on a
trailer at a time when they said they didn't know each other. The Jury evidently believed
this evidence.
6
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that the trailer had never been built, was inconsistent with Plaintiffs' previous position
that the trailer had existed . . . . Based on the inconsistency of Plaintiffs' position, the
Court holds that sanctions are appropriate on the Second Motion for Sanctions." Thus,
the District Court found that prior to the March 26, 2008 hearing, PC Crane maintained
both to the Court and to McQueen's counsel that Stam and PC Crane did collaborate on a
modified trailer, which existed, and that, after that hearing (at which the Court required
PC Crane to make disclosures that would demonstrate its prior position to be false), PC
Crane took the position that no such trailer ever existed. The Court's ruling, and the
uncontested record before this Court, establish that over eight months PC Crane and its
counsel misled both the Court and McQueen's counsel on this account. The District
Court's finding that the positions were "inconsistent" is a finding that one or the other
position was false.
ARGUMENT
1

THE AWARD OF SANCTIONS SHOULD STAND AND BE AUGMENTED.
PC Crane notes that McQueen's Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for

Sanctions is not in the record. It is there, albeit seemingly out of order, at R. 2259.
A-

PC Crane Does Not Contest the Material Facts.

Appellants' Brief contains a comprehensive description of what happened here,
meticulously supported by citations to the Record. PC Crane challenges none of those
facts. Those undisputed facts, as the District Court found, establish that over an extensive
period, PC Crane and its counsel misrepresented both to the Court and McQueen's
counsel in letters, discovery responses, and open court that there in fact existed a second
7
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trailer referred to in the Bank Disclosure that was constructed after the second crane
purchase Agreement executed in April, 2005. PC Crane's counsel argued that they
should not be required to supply discovery on this second modified trailer because it was
built after December, 2005 and was, therefore, not relevant. Only after the District Court
ordered further disclosures that would demonstrate the falsity of their statements did PC
Crane diametrically change its position to the position that there was only one modified
trailer and that no trailer modified in collaboration with Stam ever existed.9
B.

Standard of Review.

PC Crane asserts that the standard of review for the Court's decision to award
discovery sanctions is correction of error. This issue, as well as the amount of the
sanctions award are not entitled to deference because Judge Reese did not preside over
this action during the discovery abuse in question; he, like this Court will, decided the
Motion based upon the record only. Under such circumstances, the District Court's
decision is not entitled to the usual deference. West Valley City v. Young, 2001 UT App.
216 [unpublished]10 ("[W]e do not defer to the trial court's factual findings because Judge
Maughan, who ruled on the motion for a new trial, did not preside at defendant's trial.
Judge Maughan relied on the trial court record, and thus we review the evidence
presented without deference to the trial court's findings."); State v. Moore, 2009 UT App.

9

This position, also, is diametrically opposed to PC Crane's statement in the Bank
Disclosure that such a trailer was in fact built and that its existence resulted in a "dramatic
increase" in the annual revenue of the 300-ton crane.
10

A copy of this case is attached.
S
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128, TJ 5, 210 P.3d 967 (no deference given to trial court's decision "since it was a review
of the record, which this court is just as capable of reviewing as the district court").
C.

The District Court Properly Awarded Sanctions.

In Point III.A, PC Crane argues that the District Court's findings were legally
insufficient to sustain a sanction award. The only case cited by PC Crane which
addresses the findings required by the District Court in this regard is Kilpatrick v.
Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, 199 P.3d 957, which set forth the following
framework for analysis of sanctions on appeal:
Our review of a District Court's imposition of sanctions
follows a two-step process. First, we ensure that the District Court
has made a factual finding that the party's behavior merits sanctions.
Second, once the factual finding has been made, we will only disturb
the sanction if "abuse of discretion [is] clearly shown." Id. at ^f 23.
Those two prongs of the Court's analysis will now be addressed. Judge Reese's Ruling
recited that PC Crane's counsel made multiple representations to the District Court and
McQueen's counsel that there existed a different trailer for a different crane that was
outside the scope of discovery and that, after the Court's discovery Order of March 20,
2008, PC Crane's counsel took the position that the trailer at issue was never built. One
or the other of the "inconsistent" positions was necessarily false. The Court's ruling then
found, based upon the inconsistency of PC Crane's positions "that sanctions are
appropriate on the Second Motion for Sanctions." The District Court therefore made a
"factual finding that the party's behavior merits sanctions" as required by Kilpatrick,
The second prong of the analysis requires a determination whether the District
Court abused its discretion. The Court stated:
9
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y

Sanctions are warranted when "(1) the party's behavior was
willful; (2) the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the Court can
attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the party has engaged in
persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process."
[Kilpatrick at «[f 2 5 ].

The Kilpatrick Court stated that a failure to make specific factual findings regarding these
specific grounds is not necessary. The Court stated:
In Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, the Court of Appeals
held that the District Court's failure to make a specific finding of
willfulness, bad faith or fault "is not grounds for reversal if 'a full
understanding of the issues on appeal can nevertheless be determined
by the appellate court."' In Schettler, the Court of Appeals upheld
the District Court's dismissal of the case despite the absence of a
finding of willfulness where the record "clearly demonstrate[d] a
pattern of aggravated misconduct in the form of willful and
deliberate disobedience of discovery orders, fabricated testimony,
and attempted witness tampering."
The District Court's finding of sanctionable behavior is sustainable on either of two
grounds: First, the Court in its ruling adequately stated the basis for the sanction. Even
though the ruling did not use the exact words "willful" or "bad faith" or "fault" or
"persistent dilatory tactics," it is self-evident that a party's behavior is "willful," "in bad
faith," and "fault" can be attributed to the party when a party over an eight-month period
says one thing and refuses to provide discovery because the trailer exists but was
manufactured at an irrelevant time but when forced to disclose documents that would
reveal the falsity of that statement changes its position to the non-existence of any such
trailer. Second, as in the Schettler case quoted in Kilpatrick, an absence of specific
findings of willfulness, bad faith, or fault is not grounds for reversal if a full
understanding of the issues on appeal can be determined by the Appellate Court. That is
10
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surely the case here.
Utah's Appellate Courts recognize that a wide range of behaviors warrant
sanctions.11 PC Crane's behavior involved discovery responses and objections advancing
and based on a false position and oral and written statements to the Court and McQueen's
counsel conveying false information to avoid discovery of the facts. The Courts have
been intolerant of such behavior.
In Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1975), the Eighth
Circuit examined facts very similar to ours. Plaintiff originally testified in a deposition
that he had tapes of "bugged" conversations, but that he had destroyed all of the tapes.
516 F.2d at 991. He subsequently testified that some of the tapes were not destroyed and
that he had them in his possession. In a subsequent deposition, the plaintiff testified that
he had never bugged any conversations and that no tapes ever existed. The trial court
dismissed all three plaintiffs' complaints pursuant to Rule 37(d) because of the "shocking
abuse12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing the discovery process." Id.
The circuit court upheld the dismissal. Other courts have adopted the same level of
intolerance. Sandoval v. Martinez, 780 P.2d 1152 (NM Ct. App. 1989) [Complaint
dismissed because of plaintiff s dishonest and misleading discovery responses. Court

u

Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 17 P.3d 1110 [tactics that frustrate the
judicial process trigger Rule 37 sanctions]; Coxey v. Oldroyd, 2005 UT App. 185, 112
P.3d 1244 [sanctions appropriate for disregarding discovery obligations even absent a
court order compelling discovery]; Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App. 75, 999 P.2d 588
[discovery sanctions appropriate for late or incomplete responses; there need not be a
complete failure to respond],
12

The abuse there pales in comparison to what happened here.
11
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held dishonest responses amount to but are worse than a total failure to respond];
Archibeque v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 70 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 1995)
[Complaint dismissed because plaintiff gave false and misleading discovery responses];
Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 899 P.2d 594 (NM 1995) [Discovery sanctions of $150,000
upheld for false answers to interrogatories and withholding of information], PC Crane's
behavior was gross, involved multiple events of dishonesty over an extended period, and
warrants sanctions.
D.

PC Crane's Behavior Was Neither Innocent Nor Justifiable.

At pages 33-36 of its Brief, PC Crane argues that its behavior was innocent. PC
Crane makes no effort to dispute the mountain of contrary facts set forth in Appellants'
Brief. Instead, PC Crane states (i) the Fontaine trailer and the trailer referred to in the
Bank Disclosure were not the same trailer, and (ii) PC Crane's counsel's "mistake" was
innocent.
As to the first point, whether or not the trailer referred to in the Bank Disclosure
document was the same as the modified Fontaine trailer is irrelevant to this issue. What is
relevant is that for eight months PC Crane and its counsel stated again and again that
there were two trailers and that the one referred to in the Bank Disclosure was
collaborated upon and constructed after the second crane transaction closed. So long as
PC Crane could continue credibly to assert that there was in fact a second modified trailer
on which Stam and Belchers collaborated in 2006, PC Crane could continue to argue that
they knew nothing about Stam until after the second crane transaction. When forced by

12
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the Court, PC Crane was required to admit that there was only one trailer and to assert
that the second trailer (which they represented had been modified in 2006) never existed.
Whether or not the Fontaine trailer was the one referred to in the Bank Disclosure13
doesn't matter. What does matter is that PC Crane's counsel for eight months misled the
Court and McQueen by stating on multiple occasions that there were two trailers and that
the one referred to in the Bank Disclosure was in fact collaborated upon and constructed
long after the second crane transaction closed — facts that are admittedly false.
With respect to the second point, the "innocent mistake" argument, McQueen
refers the Court to Appellants' Brief, which catalogues the litany of misleading discovery
responses, outright false statements, and evasive maneuvering, none of which PC Crane
denies. For an eight-month period, McQueen through the discovery process pounded and
pounded on PC Crane in an effort to determine the absolutely critical date on which the
trailer identified in the Bank Disclosure document was modified. McQueen's counsel on
December 7, 2007, in the middle of PC Crane's eight month period of obfuscation,
advised PC Crane's counsel in writing of the seriousness of their behavior:
We intend to seek sanctions if the documents relating to this trailer
and the answer to Interrogatory No. 4 are not immediately
forthcoming. When we do, and when this matter plays out, we do
not want you or your client to be able to say that there was some
innocent mistake made. You and your client are on notice that the
trailer in question was made and titled during the time period for
I3

It should not be lost on anyone that PC Crane's latest position that the only
modified trailer was not the modified trailer referred to in the Bank Disclosure renders
absolutely false PC Crane's pre-litigation written statement in the Bank Disclosure that
such a trailer existed and enhanced revenues. The PC Crane principals who wrote the
Bank Disclosure surely knew the true facts.
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i

which production was ordered by the Court. If these documents are
not produced now, in response to this very pointed request, it
will be clear that they have been intentionally withheld.
PC Crane thereafter continued to assert the false position that there were two trailers and
that the collaborated trailer was modified after 2005, at an irrelevant time — both lies. PC
Crane's counsel recognized that McQueen was claiming that PC Crane was "lying" about
the trailer. Mr. Barneck told the Court at the March 4, 2008 hearing that McQueen's
efforts were "a witch hunt" based on "unfounded suspicions that we have been hiding or
destroying documents or lying." [R. 4002; T. 75]. Normal people, when aware that their
veracity is questioned, make certain of the truthfulness of their statements or concede
their inaccuracy and apologize. At the very same hearing, Barneck again repeated to the
Court the false facts that there were two modified trailers and that the Fontaine trailer was
not the one referred to in the Bank Disclosure. [R. 4002; T. 39, 75].
PC Crane's assertion of an "innocent" mistake is also belied by the following:
L

PC Crane's counsel's statement that there were two modified trailers was

admittedly false. Either their statement that the collaborated trailer was never constructed
or their statement that it was in fact constructed after December, 2005 was necessarily
false.
2.

The pre-litigation Bank Disclosure plainly stated that there was a modified

trailer on which Stam and Belchers collaborated. If PC Crane had stated initially that no
such trailer existed, its statement in the Bank Disclosure would thereby be shown to be
false and problematic (especially since the only trailer that PC Crane modified was
constructed before the second crane Agreement).
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3.

PC Crane, on August 7, 2007 and again on November 14, 2007, objected to

discovery requesting information about the collaborated modified trailer on the grounds
that the requests were "overly broad, unduly burdensome, and . . . not relevant." [R. 947;
1555]. Rule 26(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that counsel certified that
those objections were warranted. Before making them, PC Crane's counsel was required
to inquire about whether the modified trailer existed, where it was built, etc. The
objection was baseless if no such trailer existed. Either PC Crane's counsel violated Rule
26{g) or filed a knowing false objection.
4.

McQueen's counsel sought informally to resolve this discovery dispute. PC

Crane's counsel insisted on not responding as to any period after April, 2005. [R. 2281,
2284]. No credible reason exists for such a restriction other than to preserve the right to
claim that there was a collaborated trailer, but it was modified after April, 2005 — a
falsehood.
5.

Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that an attorney's

signature on any paper certifies "after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" that
all factual assertions are supported. PC Crane's attorneys filed multiple papers with the
Court that stated, or were necessarily based upon the facts that (i) there were two trailers
and (ii) the collaborated trailer was constructed after April 2005 (BOTH FALSE). E.g.,
R. 994, 997-98; R, 1633-34,ffif37-38. PC Crane cannot credibly claim that it made no
inquiry to determine the accuracy of these factual representations. Either PC Crane's
counsel violated Rule 11 or filed knowingly false statements.
6.

PC Crane's counsel stated repeatedly that there were two modified trailers
15
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and that the collaborated trailer was built after 2005. Alleged confusion about whether
the collaborated trailer was built at all cannot explain the affirmative false statements (i)
that the collaborated trailer was built after December 2005 and (ii) that there were two
modified trailers.
7.

PC Crane's counsel on at least nine separate occasions gave the Court and

McQueen's counsel false, misleading statements. Appellants' Brief, pp. 35-38.
8.

PC Crane's counsel made repeated false and misleading statements over an

eight month period. It is not credible that on request after request, and motion after
motion, over eight months, PC Crane remained confused.
9.

Both Mr. Barneck and Mr. Burghardt made the same multiple false

statements. It is not credible that both were confused in exactly the same way.
10.

The false statements by Messrs. Barneck and Burghardt are consistent with

the same false theme articulated by their clients, Belchers, who testified that they did not
know who Stam was and that Stam's involvement was concealed from them by McQueen
prior to the second crane transaction — when Belchers and Stam had over eighty
documented cell phone calls within the three-plus months before the closing of the second
crane transaction. [Appellants'Brief, pp. 7-9].
11.

Just 6 days after the Court ordered disclosure of information that would

prove false their prior statements about two trailers and a post-2005 collaborated trailer,
PC Crane's counsel changed their position to state that there was no collaborated trailer.
This was obviously no coincidence.
12.

The only credible, logical explanation for this behavior was that PC Crane
16
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desired to keep from McQueen the damning facts that there was only one modified trailer,
that it fit the description of the trailer described in the Bank Disclosure, and that this
trailer was modified before the second transaction.
PC Crane's Brief suggests that McQueen's characterization of its behavior in stark
terms is inappropriate. As noted in McQueen's Appellants' Brief, McQueen is aware that
Courts generally disfavor the use of such strong language. Here, however, the language
is accurate and gentle terms do not describe PC Crane's behavior.14 If McQueen had not
forcefully pursued the truth, they could have lost this case based upon dishonesty and
perversion of the legal process.
E.

The Sanctions Award Should be Augmented.

PC Crane alternatively argues that the District Court's award of sanctions should
be affirmed because (i) the District Court's award should be accorded deference by this
Court and (ii) PC Crane's misconduct was inconsequential.
McQueen's opening Brief argued that this Court should not give significant
deference to the Trial Court's conclusions because Judge Reese did not preside over PC
Crane's discovery abuse — Judge Reese, like this Court will, reviewed it only on the
record. As noted above at pp. 8-9, this Court holds that when an Appellate Court reviews
a District Court decision that was itself based exclusively on the record, the Appellate
Court gives no deference to the District Court's decision.

14

Every claim that PC Crane stated falsehoods, "lies," and/or "misleading
statements" is supported by the record. PC Crane makes no effort to demonstrate that any
of their false statements were truthful.
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With respect to the appropriate magnitude of the sanction award, McQueen relies
on Appellants' Brief, to which PC Crane offered no substantive response.
ii.

MCQUEEN SHOULD RECOVER ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN

DEFENDING AGAINST PC CRANE'S CLAIMS.
A.

McQueen is Entitled to Recover Attorney's Fees Under Section

78B-5-826.
McQueen was entitled to recover its attorney's fees, under Hooban v. Unicity
International, Inc., 2009 UT App. 287, cert, granted, 225 P.3d 880 (UT 2010), because
both elements articulated in that case for recovery were satisfied. PC Crane does not
question that fact, but asserts that this argument was not timely presented below. The
argument was not presented below because the Hooban case was not decided until after
the District Court made the subject Ruling on April 16, 2009. The apparent principle
underpinning Hooban is that it is unfair for one party to seek to recover attorney's fees
claiming a contract allows an award (whether based on the contract or Section 78B-5826) and then, if it loses, escape such liability by inconsistently claiming that the contract
does not allow such an award. That is exactly what happened here.
B.

McQueen is Entitled to Recover Legal Fees Under the Goodwill Notes,

PC Crane filed this action seeking to extinguish or rescind its obligations under the
Goodwill Notes. The Goodwill Notes provided that in the event of any default (defined
to include a failure to make payments), McQueen was entitled to recover their attorney's
fees in any collection action. PC Crane argues that because it made the payments under

18
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the Notes15, there was no "default" and the attorney's fees provisions are inapplicable.
PC Crane seemingly concedes that if it had failed to make a payment and McQueen had
sought to enforce their right to payment, attorney's fees would be recoverable. PC Crane
argues, however, that because PC Crane sued McQueen to avoid making future payments
and to recover payments already made, the recoverability of attorney's fees is different. It
is undisputed that PC Crane sued McQueen to escape liability under the Goodwill Notes
and that McQueen in their Answer sought enforcement of the Goodwill Notes and
recovery of their attorney's fees. Whether or not there were tardy payment(s) under the
Goodwill Notes, McQueen is entitled to recover their attorney's fees.
The treatment of a contractual provision allowing recovery of fees in a suit to
enforce a contract when a party files a preemptory action to avoid enforcement of the
contract was addressed in Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App. 404, 38 P.3d 1001, addressed in
Appellants' Brief at 45, et seq. PC Crane seeks to distinguish this dispositive case in less
than one page of its Brief [Appellees' Brief at p. 29]. Chase and our case are logically
indistinguishable: In both cases, plaintiff sued to rescind16 a contract allowing recovery
of attorney's fees in an action to enforce the contract. In both cases, the plaintiff argued

l5

PC Crane claims it timely made its payments (which were admittedly not timely
under the Goodwill Notes themselves) based upon a Stipulation between it and McQueen
providing that McQueen would not pursue any default remedy based upon PC Crane's
admittedly tardy payments. As noted above, at p. 2, the Stipulation itself provided that
nothing contained in it would alter McQueen's right to recover attorney's fees under the
Notes.
16

PC Crane's Complaint explicitly prayed for judgment "rescinding" the
Agreements and sought rescissional damages — recovery of all amounts paid and relief
from future payments to be paid under the Goodwill Notes.
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that the defendant's defense to the rescission claim was not a claim to enforce the contract
as the fee provision required, but rather a defense to a rescission claim. In both cases,
defendant argued that its defense of plaintiff s action to rescind was in effect an action to
enforce the contract. In both cases, plaintiff claimed that there was no liability for the
fees because it had fully performed its contractual obligations. The Court in Chase
allowed recovery of attorney's fees under a provision permitting them in "litigation to
enforce" the contract. Here, the Goodwill Notes allow recovery of attorney's fees in an
action to collect the Notes in the event of a default. In Chase, plaintiff argued that the
contract language allowing fees "to enforce" the contract was not applicable because
there was nothing to enforce — it had fully performed. Here, PC Crane argues that
because it fully paid (fully performed) under the Goodwill Notes, there was no default
and McQueen did not pursue an action to enforce the Notes. In both cases, the plaintiffs'
effort to rescind the agreements had the same effect (of seeking to escape its obligations)
as a failure to perform. The logic of the Chase decision compels the same result here.
C.

The Goodwill Notes' Attorney's Fee Provisions Apply Here.

PC Crane asserts at pp. 25-26 of its Brief that because this action was under the
purchase Agreements, not the Goodwill Notes, no attorney's fees are recoverable. As
already noted, the purchase Agreements provided that McQueen was to supply goodwill
and that PC Crane was to pay for that goodwill with the Goodwill Note(s). [See p. 1
above]. PC Crane's suit to "rescind" these obligations, to recover all payments made
under the Goodwill Notes, and to be relieved of future payments under the Goodwill
Notes clearly implicate the attorney's fee provisions of the Goodwill Notes themselves.
20
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D.

The Trust Deed Mandates Recovery of Legal Expenses,

PC Crane gave McQueen Goodwill Notes secured by a Trust Deed. For two
reasons, the Trust Deed mandates an award of attorney's fees here. First, PC Crane sued
to rescind and extinguish the entire debt secured by that Trust Deed (which necessarily
would extinguish the Trust Deed itself). PC Crane argues that because the District Court
found that PC Crane did not fail to make a payment under the Goodwill Notes17, this
provision does not apply. That is not the point - the point is that PC Crane sued
McQueen to extinguish all of the obligations secured by the Trust Deed (and hence the
Trust Deed itself), which implicated the Trust Deed's provisions entitling McQueen to
defend any action which "affect[ed] the security [of the Trust Deed] or the rights . . . of
[McQueen]." PC Crane's argument as to the second prong of the Trust Deed's attorney's
fees provision is that because McQueen was unsuccessful in attempting to avoid being
forced to reconvey the Trust Deed, no attorney's fees should be awarded in that effort.
Judge Dever, at PC Crane's request, entered an Order requiring McQueen to accept
payment of the Goodwill Notes and forcing McQueen to reconvey the Trust Deed over
McQueen's objection that the Trust Deed still secured attorney's fees and could not
properly yet be reconveyed. The Trust Deed's provisions permit recovery of attorney's
fees in defending against any effort to affect that Trust Deed. The Trust Deed

17

PC Crane sued to extinguish its debt under both Goodwill Notes long before they
were either due or paid.
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necessarily18 does not require that McQueen prevail in those efforts. Either of the two
grounds noted above independently justifies an award of fees here.
E.

The Guarantors are Liable for Attorney's Fees.

PC Crane asserts that the Guaranty gives rise to attorney's fees liability only if
"there is a default on the underlying instrument." Id. The Guaranty [Ex. 59; Addendum
at p. 15] does not so provide. As set forth in Appellants' Brief at page 48, the Guaranty's
provision for the recovery of attorney's fees is much broader than those of the Goodwill
Notes and applies in this case.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S COST AWARD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
The parties agree on the rule applicable to the recovery of deposition expenses as

costs:
The general rule regarding the recovery of deposition costs is
that a party may recover deposition costs as long as the "trial court is
persuaded that [the depositions] were taken in good faith and, in
light of the circumstances, appear to be essential for the development
and presentation of the case." Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, «| 6.
PC Crane objects to the award of costs for the following depositions:
Kelly Banyard. First, Ms. Banyard was the accountant for both PC Crane and
McQueen and was a critical trial witness. The deposition of Banyard was essential to
present McQueen's case ~ and Banyard would obviously not, absent subpoena and

18

Trust Deeds typically contain such provisions, the plain basis for them being that
if anyone or anything challenges the security of a Trust Deed, the creditor should be
entitled to defend against that challenge without eroding the secured debt by the
expenditure of attorney's fees. To serve that purpose, fees must be recoverable whether
or not the effort is successful.
22
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deposition, have shared with McQueen relevant documents and information about her
other client, PC Crane. PC Crane utilized her deposition (referred to therein as Ex. 7) in
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of May 17, 2007. [R. 366]. It is difficult to
understand why PC Crane deemed the deposition necessary (and used it) but asserts that
McQueen had no such need.
Jason K. Nelsen. Nelsen was the attorney that represented PC Crane in its
negotiations with McQueen. PC Crane's Complaint alleged that McQueen's attorney
prepared documents that materially changed the terms of the parties' agreement, PC
Crane had no input into the documents, and McQueen misled PC Crane about the
documents. [Complaint ^ 82, 95, 108; R. 1]. As it turns out, it was PC Crane's attorney,
Nelsen (not McQueen's attorney), who drafted the very provisions in the documents of
which PC Crane complained. McQueen filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
[R. 664], which extensively relied upon the Nelsen deposition. See particularly, R. 671673. The Court granted McQueen's Motion. [R. 3954]. The deposition of Nelsen was
essential to McQueen's presentation of and prevailing on its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, which resulted in the dismissal of three Counts of PC Crane's Complaint.
Courtney Belcher. Courtney Belcher was Belchers' office manager. Belchers and
Stam all testified that there was a written commission agreement between them. Although
twice ordered by the Court to produce it, Belchers claimed they could not find this critical
document. It was necessary to depose Ms. Belcher to pursue the location of the critical
commission agreement. At her deposition, she testified she had never done a search of
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her computer for documents relevant to this lawsuit, that no one ever told her not to delete
from her computer records that relate to this lawsuit, and that she "deletes documents all
the time." This information from Ms. Belcher's deposition was used to support
McQueen's first Motion to Compel. [R. 832 — Courtney Belcher Depo. cited at 844, et
seq.]. Clearly, when a party allegedly "can't find" absolutely critical documents that
plainly exist, it is necessary to pursue discovery of its document custodian to determine
the steps taken to locate the documents. That Motion resulted in the Court's entering an
Order requiring that PC Crane's computers be inspected to search for outstanding
discovery requests. [R. 1098, ^ 3 ] .
Second Depositions of P. Belcher, D. Belcher, V. Belcher, and L. Stam. These
depositions were all taken in connection with the trailer modification issue. The District
Court granted McQueen's Third Motion to Compel on March 20, 2008 and allowed
McQueen to depose the Belchers and Stam on the trailer issue. [R. 2081-2083, <[ 4.b].
After the Court entered that Order, PC Crane changed its position to the assertion that the
collaborated trailer was never built. The second round of depositions were essential to
and an integral part of the briefing for McQueen's Second Motion for Sanctions, which
was granted by the District Court. [See Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for
Sanctions, R. 2259, et seq., to which P. Belcher's deposition is attached at R. 2336, D.
Belcher's at 2341, V. Belcher's at 2345, and Stam's at 2354]. If McQueen had not
invested the tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees doggedly pursuing these issues, they
would never have uncovered one of the most critical facts presented to the Jury in this

24

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

case — that Stam and Belchers in fact collaborated on modifying a trailer before they
claimed to know each other.
Each of the depositions were found by the District Court to be properly taxable.
Based upon the facts as outlined above, there is no abuse of discretion in these
determinations.
CONCLUSION
As concerns the Cross-Appeal, McQueen requests the following relief:
1.

Affirm the District Court's determination that sanctions are appropriate.

2.

Affirm the District Court's award of costs.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Z

day of July, 2010.

Maak, Of Counsel
BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
GREENWOOD.
*1 Defendant Cindy Young appeals her convictions
of assault of a peace officer, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4
(1999), and failure to register her vehicle, a Class C
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. &
sect; 41-la-201 (1998). Defendant appeals the jury
verdict, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel
and arguing the trial court erred in denying her motion for a new trial based on the same grounds. We
affirm.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), the Supreme Court
adopted a two prong test to determine whether
counsel failed to render adequate legal assistance.
Under Strickland, "a defendant must show (1) that
counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the
performance prejudiced the defense." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah Ct.App .1997). A trial
court is required to follow Strickland when ruling

on a motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d
182, 185-86 (Utah 1990). Further, "where a trial
court has previously heard a motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel, reviewing courts are
free to make an independent determination of a trial
court's conclusions. The factual findings of the trial
court, however, shall not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous." Id. at 186 (footnote omitted). Normally, such deference is granted because
the trial court observed the trial and is in an advantaged position to assess defense counsel's performance.
In the present case, however, we do not defer to the
trial court's factual findings because Judge
Maughan, who ruled on the motion for a new trial,
did not preside at defendant's trial. Judge Maughan
relied on the trial court record, and thus we review
the evidence presented without deference to the trial court's findings. See Davis County v. Clearfield
City, 756 P.2d 704, 710 (Utah Ct .App. 1988)
("[I]nsofar as the trial court's decision turns on the
administrative record, we give no particular deference to the trial court."). FN1
FN1. As this case demonstrates, it is problematic for a judge to hear a motion for
new trial when another judge presided over
the trial. The trial judge has the advantage
of listening to witnesses, evaluating their
demeanor, and observing the performance
of counsel. Through this first-hand knowledge, the trial judge can consider motions
for a new trial in light of his or her experience during trial and make reasoned determinations whether a new trial is appropriate. Thus, when possible, a judge who
presides over the trial should also hear and
decide a motion for new trial.
In this case, the second Strickland prong is dispositive, and we need not address trial counsel's performance. To satisfy the second prong, "defendant
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must show that a 'reasonable probability' exists
that the trial result would have been different if
counsel had not erred." Classon, 935 P.2d at 532
(citation omitted). This prong is not satisfied because the evidence defendant argues should have
been presented does not create a reasonable probability of a different result.
A significant portion of the evidence defendant describes relates only to events occurring after the assault. Defendant argues that additional evidence
about the effects of pepper spray would have
demonstrated that she involuntarily fought against
the officers as they attempted to place her in handcuffs. The assault charges, however, were based on
defendant kicking and scratching Officer Lozano
prior to being sprayed, and thus the pepper spraying
does not affect the evidence supporting defendant's
conviction for assault. Further, the officers testified
concerning the effects of pepper spray and trial
counsel argued these effects to the jury.
*2 Similarly, many of the witnesses defendant argues should have testified arrived at the scene after
the assault occurred and thus could not have testified regarding the assault. Defendant argues these
witnesses would have testified that she was not sitting as the officers claimed, but that she was kneeling. She argues this evidence would have shown the
officers did not truthfully recount the incident.
However, the witness who testified on defendant's
behalf also disagreed with her and the officers as to
defendant's position after the arrest. Thus, there is
not a reasonable probability this additional evidence would have affected the jury's decision.
Defendant argues that the EMT who arrived on the
scene and additional medical testimony would have
demonstrated that Officer Lozano was not injured
by defendant. The testimony at trial indicated that
defendant kicked and scratched Officer Lozano.
Lozano and the other officers testified that Lozano
was bleeding from her hand, but another officer
testified that he saw no blood. An examination of
the affidavits and relevant testimony reveals that an
injury did occur to Officer Lozano, though poten-
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tially less severe than that described by one witness. However, even if the injury was not as severe
as one officer testified during trial, the undisputed
evidence shows that an injury did occur. Additionally, defendant's conviction did not require testimony of a specific injury. The testimony that defendant kicked and scratched Lozano sufficiently
supports the assault conviction.
Defendant next argues trial counsel's failure to suggest she plead guilty to the charge of expired registration forced her to defend this charge without a
viable defense, causing defendant to lose credibility
with the jury. However, the State would have
presented the bulk of the same evidence to show
why Lozano attempted to impound defendant's
vehicle. It was defendant's resistance to Lozano's
attempt to impound the vehicle that led to the assault. Therefore, failure to plead guilty to the expired registration charge did not prejudice defendant.
Defendant finally argues that her trial counsel
should have introduced evidence that Officer Lozano acted in an over-aggressive manner because she
believed defendant was violating a protective order
at the time of the incident. However, this argument
is too speculative to undermine our confidence in
the jury's decision. See State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d
1250, 1254 (Utah 1993) ("[P]roof of counsel's ineffectiveness must be a demonstrable reality, not
mere speculation.").
In sum, the evidence that defendant argues her trial
counsel should have presented does not create a
reasonable probability of a different outcome at her
trial for assault of a peace officer. Additionally, defendant presents no argument that her conviction
for expired registration should be reversed. Accordingly, we affirm defendant's convictions.
JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge, and ORME,
Judge, concur.
UtahApp.,2001.
West Valley City v. Young
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